Smart grid is an alternative solution of the conventional power grid which harnesses the power of the information technology to save the energy and meet todays' environment requirements. Due to the inherent vulnerabilities in the information technology, the smart grid is exposed to wide variety of threats that could be translated into cyber-attacks. In this paper, we develop a deep learning-based intrusion detection system to defend against cyber-attacks in the advanced metering infrastructure network. The proposed machine learning approach is trained and tested extensively on an empirical industrial dataset which is composed of several attack' categories including the scanning, buffer overflow, and denial of service attacks. Then, an experimental comparison in terms of detection accuracy is conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach with Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, and Random Forest. The obtained results suggest that the proposed approaches produce optimal results comparing to the other algorithms. Finally, we propose a network architecture to deploy the proposed anomalybased intrusion detection system across the Advanced metering infrastructure network. In addition, we propose a network security architecture composed of two types of Intrusion detection system types, Host and Network based, deployed across the Advanced Metering Infrastructure network to inspect the traffic and detect the malicious one at all the levels.
INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is an alternative of the conventional power system since it harness the power of the communication and the information technology (ICT) in generating, delivering, and consuming the energy power. Unlike the traditional power grid, the smart grid enables the two-way flow of information which creates an automated and widely distributed system that offers new functionalities such as operational efficiency, grid resilience, real time control, and better integration of the renewable technology. However, the inherent weaknesses in the ICT exposes the power grid to wide variety of threats that can be exploited it and translated it into impactful cyber-attacks. Such cyber-attacks can cause interruption in the power generation causing disturbance in the system stability and a potential socio-economic impact [10] .
Despite the wide variety of the industrial cyber-attacks, they usually attempts to compromise these three security parameters: confidentiality, availability, and integrity [11] . The first class of attacks which target the confidentiality includes attacks such as Traffic analysis attack [17] , Modbus network scanning [2] , and DNP3 network scanning [7] which target the two industrial protocol Modbus and DNP3, respectively. The second category of attacks which target the availability of the system includes attack such as Puppet attack [25] , the Time delay switch attack and the Time synchronization attack [27] which are considered as a denial of service attack. The third category of attacks include the false data injection attack, popping the Home Machine Interface (HMI) [17] , Masquerade attack [17] , and jamming attack [13] .
Defending against these various cyber-attacks in a distributed and heterogeneous system, such as smart grid, is challenging. The smart grid consists of several system and protocols including the supervisory and control and data acquisition (SCADA), the demand response system, the automation substation, and the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). In this paper we will focus on defending against cyber-attacks in the AMI network because it constitutes the main connection point between the Home Area Network (HAN) with the Neighborhood Area network (NAN) and the Wide Area Network (WAN). The AMI Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is responsible for collecting, measuring and To protect the AMI network and defend against the malicious anomaly, we propose in this paper an intrusion detection system (IDS). There are three distinct category of IDS: specification based approach, anomaly based approach, and signature-based approach. The first approach is based on the logical specification for identifying deviations from the normal behavior profile. The second approach utilizes the statistical measures to distinguish between the normal and anomalous behavior. The third category consists in discriminating the malicious behavior from the normal one using a database of known attack signatures [3] . The main drawback in adopting the specification and logical based approaches is that they require a frequent update of the attacks' database and the specifications' list. In this paper, we propose an anomaly based intrusion detection system (IDS).
A well-known criticism of the anomaly based IDS is its high rate of false positive and low rate of the accuracy. Therefore, several research papers have been published to address this issues and improve the IDS performances in the AMI network. For instance, the authors of [6] proposed an IDS based on both the anomalybased and signature based approaches. Their proposed IDS is divided into two main modules: passive and active modules. The passive module is responsible for inspecting the steaming data using the specification based approach while the active module is utilized the anomaly based approach. Their solution is deployed using a single-pass algorithm called FP-Steam. Authors in [20] proposed and a sequence mining based IDS approach. In their approach the sequence mining algorithms is utilized to collect the network data stream and then a sliding window technique is used for detecting the network intrusions. Based on their obtained results, the proposed approach report high accuracy rate. In [26] , authors proposed a distributed IDS for the entire Smart Grid network based on two clonal algorithms named AIRS2Parallel and CLONALEG, which are derived from the support vector machine and the artificial immune system. The proposed IDS architecture is deployed in the grid through three main network: HAN, NAN, and WAN. The authors of [21] proposed a signature based IDS approach using the time-table-joined frequent serial episode for extracting the signatures from the time-series stream. In [16] , authors proposed a Fuzzy logic approach for detecting automatically the characteristics of clusters, which could be anomalous or a normal cluster, from the network data stream. In [12] , the authors proposed an IDS based on the data stream mining approach for the AMI network. In their approach, the authors conduced a comparison performance of seven stream data mining classifiers based on several metrics including the accuracy, the processing time, and the false positive rate.
In our previous paper, we have conducted a performance comparison between several machine learning based IDS approaches including Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and Random Forest. To the author's best knowledge, this is the first attempt to propose a Deep learning (DL) based approach for the AMI network.
In this paper, we propose a feasible security network architecture to deploy the proposed IDS across the AMI network at the key points in order to detect the intrusion at all the levels. The proposed DL-based IDS approach is trained and tested extensively on the NSL KDD data set which include different categories of cyberattacks where three activation functions are experimented: Sigmoid, Relu, and Tanh in order to improve detection accuracy. The optimal output is compared against Support Vector Machine, Naïve Bayes, and Random Forest. The comparison is based on several performance metrics including the probability of detection, the probability of false alarm, and the probability of miss detection. This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section is divided into three subsections. Subsection one describes how the proposed IDS architecture can detect the intrusions at the key position of the AMI network. The second one explains the DLbased while the third one describes presents the proposed methodology used to preprocess the dataset. The second section show and discuss the obtained results. In the last section, we draw some conclusions.
Methodology 2.1 Proposed IDS for the AMI network
A typical Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is composed of three main components: smart meters, an AMI headend, and a network communication. A smart meter is a digital meter responsible for collecting in real-time the measurement and transmit these data to AMI headend. The headend consists of two main parts: the AMI server, which is responsible for collecting the meter data, and a meter data management system (MDMS), which manages collected data and shares it with other systems such as demand response systems, historians, billing systems. The communication between the smart meters and the AMI headend passes through several network protocols including the power line communications (PLC), Zigbee, Z-Wave, and the Wireless M-Bus [3] .
Since the AMI system is highly connected network and a weaknesses in one component exposes the entire system to a wide variety of risk. Thus, we proposed an end-to-end security strategy with two lines of defense. As shown in Figure. 1, the first line is ensured by the Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). The HIDS is deployed at smart meters and the AMI backend server and its main purpose is to protect the firmware, the operating system and the software, and the network interfaces of these devices. There are several cyberattacks can target primarily the smart meter devices and the AMI backend server including virus, worm, Trojan horse, MITM, and DoS attacks. The HIDS defends against those cyberattacks by analyzing specific host-based actions, such as the used applications, the accessed files and the data resides in the kernel logs.
The second line of defense consists of the Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). The AMI network is subject to various network attacks including the Replay attack, Jamming channel attack, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The NIDS defends against those cyberattacks by sniffing and inspecting the AMI network traffic and it provides broader examination of the entire network. The HIDS is not able to detect these malicious intrusion until they breach the system while the NIDS can detect the unauthorized intrusion before the attacker reaches the system. Therefore, combining the HIDS and NIDS as two lines of defenses can create a robust defensive strategy to protect the three main AMI components: smart meters, the AMI headend, and the communication network. In this work, we propose a DL-based approach for both the HIDS and NIDS.
Deep learning based intrusion detection approach
Classifying the events in the AMI network into malicious and normal events can be approached as binary classification problem in which two classes of events are considered: normal event or malicious event. Assigning each event into one of these two classes requires a supervised machine learning approach which is trained on a labeled dataset. Deep learning (DL) is considered a classification algorithm consisting of an input layer, several hidden layers, usually more than 3 hidden layers, and an output layer. Each layer is composed of several neurons nodes and every node in a layer is directly connected to every other node in the next layer leading to create a deeper neural network [14] . This architecture is used to extract automatically the features from data and make predictive classification about new data.
A typical neuron takes several input 1 , 2 , … . , each of which is multiplied by a given weight, 1 , 2 , … . , . These inputs are multiplied by their corresponding weights and summed together to pass them through a non-linear activation function. The equation of a given node is expressed as:
Where is the bias term which allows to shift the results of the activation function to the left or right and to train the model when the input features are 0. In this paper, the inputs 1 , 2 , … . , are the features which represents the each network event in the dataset. Example of these features include the network protocol type, the flag, the service, the IP address of the sender and the receiver, and the Port source and destination. These inputs are fed into an activation function. There are three major types of activation functions: Sigmoid, Relu function, and Tanh function [4] .
In Sigmoid function, the output is bounded between 0 and 1. When the input is very large, the output is close to 1, and when the input is very small then the output is close to 0. The values between these two extremes is represented as an S-shape. This function is expressed as [4] :
Where is the input value of a given feature.
The Relu function which stands for the restricted linear unit (ReLu), is a non-linear function expressed as follows [4] :
The Tanh function is similar to the sigmoid function, however instead of ranging from 0 to 1, the Tanh's output ranges from -1 to 1. The Tanh function is preferred over the sigmoid function since it is zero-centered. Tahnh function is expressed as [4] :
Where is the input value of a given feature. In this paper, the three types of activation functions are considered to train and the test the proposed model.
Training the DL model passes through two majors steps: forward propagation and backpropagation. In the forward propagation, the training inputs examples are weighted and pass thought the activation function to compute an output for each node. This output is compared against the actual output of the training dataset in order to measure the error using the loss function. There are various loss functions type including the mean square error, mean absolute error, mean bias error, and Cross Entropy loss function. Since we are dealing with a classification problem, we select the Cross Entropy loss function which is expressed as [19] :
Where the is the actual output and ′ is the computed one. Once the loss function is computed, the backpropagation is performed in order to propagate the error to every node in the network and reducing the error by updating the weights using a gradient descent optimization algorithms. There are several types of optimizers including Adaptive moment estimation (Adam), Nesterov accelerated gradient, Adagrad, Adadelta, RMSprop [23] . According to [23] , Adam is the optimal optimizer comparing to other gradient descent optimization algorithms. Thus Adam is selected as an optimizer with DL in this paper.
Since it is challenging to classify each packet as a normal of an attack with 100% confidence, we use the Softmax function in the last hidden layer to compute the probability of distribution over a set of mutually exclusive labels (0 and 1 in this case). Thus, this probability provides the level of confidence of the prediction. It is expressed as:
Where is the activation function of a neuron and is the total number of hidden neurons.
NSL_KDD Dataset Preprocessing
The dataset used in this paper is the NSL_KDD dataset which is an improved version of the KDD cup 99 which was gathered at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory [24, 28] . In the NSL_KDD version several improvements have been conducted including eliminating the redundant records and removing the bias in the data distribution [5, 18] . The NSL_KDD includes of 148 481 records splited into training and testing data. Each record represents a network packet and it consists of 41 features, where 34 are numerical and 7 are symbolic, and an output which could be a normal packet or an attack. An attack can belongs to one of these four attack's category: Attacks fall into the four categories: Denial of service (DOS), Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R), and Probing [8, 22] Table 1 gives a description of each attack's category and the number of records of each category in the dataset. In this paper, we put these four attack's categories as one category named: attack. Thus, the dataset has two output either normal or attack packets. Before feeding the DL with the training dataset, the NSL_KDD dataset has to preprocessed by transforming and standardizing the data in order to help the DL algorithm to converge quickly. Data transformation step consists of converting the nominal and categorical data into a numerical data. In this paper, we used Table  2 as a model to performs the mapping between the nominal symbols into numerical numbers. 
Where is the feature's value, μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the dataset.
Results and discussion
The proposed DL is implemented using the Tensorflow [1] and Keras framework [15] and it is trained and tested using the crossvalidation technique with 10 folds. In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed classifier, two performance metrics are selected: detection accuracy and loss function. The accuracy is expressed as the number of correctly classified events over the total number of events. The loss function is given by equation (5) . As simulation parameters, we initial the number of layers to two hidden layers with 300 neuron nodes each. In addition, we initialize the number of epochs to 3. Simulation results are given in Figures 2 through 6. Figure 2 illustrates the accuracy as function of the number of packets for three different activation functions Relu, Sigmoid, and Tanh functions.
In this first simulation, we build two hidden layers with 300 hidden neurons each and an output layer with 10 neuron nodes. In addition, we define three epochs of each one of these three activation functions. As it can be seen, the Sigmoid function reports the higher accuracy rate followed by Thanh function then the Relu function.
The accuracy of the Sigmoid function increases slightly as the number of packets increases to reaches the peak, which is 98,34%, when 100 768 packets. Similarly, the Tanh function's accuracy follows almost the same trends which increases slightly as the number of packets increase to reach the highest accuracy, which is Figure 4 shows the accuracy of the three activation function with Softmax as a function of the number of epochs, which means an entire pass through the training dataset in order to define the optimal number of passes require for the gradient to converge to an optimum point. As it can be seen, the accuracy of the Sigmoid function with the Softmax function increases between 2 and 10 epochs then it changes slightly between 98% and 99.5% before stabilizing after 80 epochs and reaches the highest accuracy values of 99.5% at 100 epochs. Similarly, The Tanh with the Softmax function follows the same tendency with lower accuracy but it outperforms the Sigmoid function when the number of epochs is equal to 50 and 70 epochs. The Relu with the Softmax function exhibits the lowest accuracy. It increases exponentially between 2 and 10 epochs and it stabilizes at 94% before increasing to 97% with more than 7 epochs and then drops 94% at 100 epochs. Number of packets Number of packets Figure 4 and 5 suggest that the optimal activation function is the Sigmoid function which show the optimal performance in terms of accuracy and error with 100 epochs.
Since the DL with Sigmoid and Softmax function reports the optimal results comparing to Relu and Tanh Function, we conducted a parametric study in order to define the optimal number of nodes and hidden layers to improve further the performance of the DL with the Sigmoid function in terms of accuracy and the obtained results as shown in Figure 6 . As one can see, the higher accuracy value, which 97.1% is produced by 2 hidden layers with 5 neuron nodes each. The accuracy decreases to 95.5% with 5 and 10 hidden layers then it drops and stagnates at 52.9% with more than 10 layers. Table 3 gives the comparison's results of the proposed DL-based approach with three machine learning based IDS approaches namely: Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Naïve Bayes. This comparison was conducted on 100 768 packets where the cross validation techniques was used to evaluate the performance of each approach. We selected the optimal results obtained from the previous experiment. Thus, we selected the Sigmoid as an activation function with 2 hidden layers and 5 neurons nodes each. Regarding the other approaches, we conducted a parametric study for each approach in order to select the parameters' values which produce the optimal results in terms of accuracy. Therefore, we set the number of trees in the Random Forest to 100, and select the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel for SVM. As it can be seen from Table 3 , the proposed approach reports the optimal result with a detection accuracy of 95.5%.
Random Forest exhibits good performances with an accuracy of 99.3% then Naïve Bayes which reports 88.9% and finally SVM which shows poor performance with an accuracy of 61.7%. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a Deep learning based Intrusion detection system approach for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure Network. The proposed classifier is trained and tested extensively on the NSL_KDD dataset which includes more that 148 480 events, which are classified into normal and attack event, and 41 features. An extensive experimental study is conducted to define the suitable number of hidden layers, number of nodes and the activation function required to classify accuracy each event. In addition, the proposed approach is compared against three machine learning based IDS approach: Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and Support Vector machine. The obtained results suggests that the proposed DL-based IDS approach with the Sigmoid activation function, 2 hidden layers , and 5 neurons nodes each is able to classify the packets into normal and malicious with an accuracy of 99.5%. The comparison results show that the proposed approach outperforms Random Forest, SVM, and Naïve Bayes based IDS approach.
